



GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

GENERAL HAS PLAYED CRITIC

Levelled Sharp Complaints
On Military Set-Up In Book

By MARK S. WATSON

(Sun Military Correspondent)

Washington, June 26 — Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor's return to active duty and appointment as the President's military representative may well provide that distinguished soldier with more significant influence than he had, even as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1955 to 1959.

His new job has no executive authority or administrative responsibility. But it does place him closer to the nation's Commander in Chief of the armed services than are the top commanders of the Army, Navy or Air Force or the joint chiefs chairman.

In that unique position—there has been nothing remotely like it since the days after 1941 when the late Adm. William D. Leahy served as "White House chief of staff" to Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman—General Taylor, back on active duty, will be able, with Presidential approval, not only to respond to inquiries on military matters but, presumably, to initiate advice.

Criticisms In Book

For that reason there is natural interest in views which Taylor held in January, 1960, just after his retirement from the Army when he was less inhibited than he had been while on active duty.

In his book, "The Uncertain Trumpet," he made some fierce criticisms of the nation's military policy, set-up, and performance, and thereafter (even while serving as President Kennedy's informal adviser since the Cuban fiasco) he has given no public revision of the book's views.

Besides sharp general complaints about "cobwebs fogging

the thought processes of our senior leadership" and "fuzzy thinking" in the nation's defense planning, and warning against "a serious crisis about 1961," Taylor's book made these specific declarations:

1. It is a "great fallacy" to regard massive retaliation as a sufficient war deterrent. Rather, reliance on nuclear weapons is likely to provoke a nuclear war or else "compromise and retreat."

Indicates Similar View

It is worth noting that President Kennedy has indicated much the same view, and has stated a need for additional limited war preparation. He has not gone nearly as far as Taylor urged, however, in actual Army expenditures for modernization.

2. Taylor's charge was that grave harm had been done by the reduction of the armed services. This he applied particularly to the Army, and although the President has made modest increases in certain areas, the net increase of Army forces has been extremely small. No "lost division" has been restored.

3. Taylor charged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure has not brought about firm decisions on most important military issues; rather, that the joint chiefs' decisions have represented a weak compromise or have been delayed altogether.

Favors Single Chief

During 1960, it may be noted, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., then Defense Secretary, initiated a more positive participation in joint chiefs deliberations, and this practice has been markedly extended by the present Secretary, Robert S. McNamara.

Neither of them, however, has

given any support to Taylor's radical proposal for a single Chief of Staff (from one of the armed services) with two deputies (from the other two), nor has President Kennedy thus far shown publicly any leaning toward that set-up.

4. Taylor was particularly hostile to the performance to date by the National Security Council headed by the President and including primarily the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, chairman of the joint chiefs, and the Central Intelligence Agency chief.

His charge was that it had failed to provide the joint chiefs with the meaningful policy which it nevertheless expected them to implement. He held this meant that there was no clear relating of major foreign policy commitments to the means of carrying them out.

5. Taylor was particularly critical of the defense budget method which he said has always pitted the services together and led to unproductive compromises and expensive "trade-offs." He urged, rather, a budget based upon "functions" of national defense, with subsequent assignment of functions to the services.

In this field, it would appear, the new Defense Secretary is decidedly sympathetic already.

General Taylor's services will be in the realms of intelligence as well as the military, and a high-level linking here must be recognized as of outstanding importance.

Intelligence has always been necessarily a prime concern of all the military services, but the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, primarily with civilian operation, has seemed most unfortunate to create something of a split between civilian and military organizations in their pursuits and appraisals of information essential both to military and foreign policy planning.

It may prove that this prospective relinking will be one of the most valuable results of General Taylor's recent studies of salutary lessons from the Cuban business—itsself a tragic example of what happens when intelligence and operations are not precisely coordinated.

The Taylor report on his intentions today's appointment may be its first visible and most valuable